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Although it only involves a limited number of Third
World countries, the Lome Convention reflects the philoso-
phy and current state of the relationship between the Euro-
pean Community and its former colonies from the South.
The Convention was originally designed and drawn up
with a view to encouraging the development of the coun-
tries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific – the so-cal-
led ACP states – , but it appears that subsequent events,
especially of recent date, pose a threat to the spirit of 
Lome.
The fishery Accords which have corne within the scope
of this Convention since the first of them was signed in 
1983 coincide with the recognition of the new Law of the 
Sea and so far involve twenty or so ACP states. In a similar
fashion to the farming Accords, the fishery Accords have 
not reached their objectives as development aid and remain
primarily agreements of a commercial nature aimed at sa-
tisfying the needs of a market economy.
The introduction of new provisions aimed at bringing the
Convention into alignment with the IMF's structural ad-
justment programmes and the disturbfng limitation in the
number of fishery accords lead us to conclude that we are
presently witnessing a change in the direction of the Euro-
pean Community's policy towards its partners from the
South. But is this policy geared towards encouraging the
poorest among them ?
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Editorial
A VITAL ISSUE FOR THE FUTURE
OF NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
Originally, the Lome convention aimed to be the framework for genuine develop-ment cooperation between the Old Continent and its former colonies. It was an
instrument which, without being a cure for all ills, provided substantial guarantees
for countries that had been exhausted by years of economic, political and cultural
domination by Europe.
However, from the 80’s onwards, the demands made by neo-liberalism and the
priority given to the market economy overrode the research effort and support
deployed in favour of autonomous and balanced development of countries which
nevertheless make up a majority of the so-called ”lesser developed countries”
(LDC’s).
The fishery Accords in particular, despite the financial compensation they bring
with them and the additional aid for training and research, do not contribute to any
real development of ACP countries’ fisheries. There is a simple reason for this : they
are commercial, rather than development agreements. They are a god-send for the
industrial fleets of the European Community which, thanks to the Accords, are grant-
ed the enormous advantage of being able to exploit for their own profit waters which
are rich in both fish and shell-fish of high commercial value. Without these Accords,
the fishing fleets of the rich countries of Europe would be forcibly laid up and their
crews dismissed on account of the over-fishing in Northern waters.
Moreover, the aid for research and training is largely piecemeal and the stipula-
tions of the Accords are by no means obeyed as they should be. For example, very
few fishermen from ACP countries have found a berth on board European
Community vessels for training purposes, as the Lome Convention gives them the
right to expect.
The new Lome Accords signed in 1990 give no reason to believe that the EC 
is moving towards a more committed policy of development cooperation. The 
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economic demands of the 1993 Single Market, the channelling of aid towards the
new democracies in the East, the search for more lucrative markets with more
credit-worthy partners... are all ominous portents for the world’s poorest 
countries.
After being the most colonial of continents in the history of mankind, can it be
that present-day Europe, or what will very soon become of it with the probable
integration of certain countries from the East, is once again going to miss one of
the great opportunities of History ? As the third millenium dawns, Europe is being
given a great chance : to make a full assessment of the poor countries’ demo-
graphic importance in the very near future, and to reply generously to their most
basic needs.
From this point of view, the development of small-scale fisheries in Third World
countries is a vital issue. Will Europe meet this challenge ? The future of relations
between North and South is at stake.
François BELLEC
Editor
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When the European Economic
Community (EEC) was constituted, and
ratified by the signature of the Treaty of
Rome on 25 March 1957, the six mem-
ber states at the time(1) decided to unite
their economies in a Common Market.
No provision was made, however,
regarding development cooperation links
with their African colonies, wich had
not yet achieved independence. There
was only an appendix to the Treaty
declaring that the Six wished to partici-
pate in the economic and social devel-
opment of the overseas countries and
territories ”with which they enjoyed a
special relationship”.
(1) France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy
THE LOME CONVENTION :
HOW IT ORIGINATED
AND HOW IT HAS FARED
To understand the ”raison d'être” and scope of the European
Community's fishery Accords with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean
and the Pacific-the so-called ACP states — we felt it was necessary to
replace them in the historical context of the Lome Convention's begin-
nings. Then to examine some features of its record over the years.
It is significant that the fishery accords only began to be given partic-
ular attention by the European Community (EC) from Lome III onwards
(1983). There is a clear connection with the adoption of the new Law of
the Sea in 1982, and with the recognition of the Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZ). Nevertheless, the Accords very existence stems from the
strong relationship of economic interdependence between Europe and
the ACP countries, which the successive Lome Conventions have
attempted to regulate with varying success.
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The coming
of independence
A strong wind of independence blew
all over Africa during the sixties.
Nonetheless, contrary to what one
might expect, the newly-constituted
African states (except Guinea) asked to
remain associated with the EEC where
access to European markets and finan-
cial aid were concerned. The negotia-
tions which gave substance to their
ideas for development cooperation
where both long and difficult, but culmi-
nated in an agreement called the 1st
Yaounde Convention (July 20 1963),
named after the capital of Cameroon.
This Convention, which was signed for
a period of five years between the six
European states of the EEC and eighteen
African states including Madagascar, had
two objectives : to facilitate the associate
states’ trade links, to guarantee ECC
financial and technical aid to the African
states and to contribute to their capital
investments through the European
Development Fund (EDF).
The African countries involved had
inherited economic structures of a colo-
nial type based essentially on cash
crops for export. In the short term at
least, they needed export earnings in
order to rebuild their countries. Access
to the European market was therefore
essential if they were to sell their pro-
duce. At the same time, they needed
the European Economic Community’s
financial aid in order to build up their
infrastructures and state machinery.
While the EDF did in fact begin by
helping to develop infrastructures, it
should be emphasized that it also con-
tributed to the development of food
crops in order to encourage these coun-
tries’ economic autonomy.
The Yaounde Convention was not
greeted with unanimous international
approval. It was strongly criticized by the
USA which favored total freedom in mat-
ters of world trade, as it also was by other
Third World Countries. The latter objected
to the preferential treatment meted out by
Europe to its associates and considered
themselves to be the victims of a discrim-
inatory system. They wanted the EEC to
open its markets to their products as well.
Thus the second Yaounde
Convention was signed on 29 July
1969. This Convention was also of five
years’ duration and tended to tone down
the preferential treatment enjoyed by
the African states and Madagascar.
Some hard negotiating took place on
the issue of the entry of certain agricul-
tural products to the European
Community. So appeared for the first
time the demand for an efficient com-
modity price support system.
When Great Britain, Ireland and
Denmark joined the EEC in January
1972, they brought the Commonwealth
countries with them in their wake, thus
making them eligible for associative sta-
tus within the Convention. Twenty of
them, located in Africa, the Caribbean,
and the Pacific, could then engage in
negociations about their future with the
European Community. But the
Commonwealth countries were hesitant :
such an association smacked of neo-
colonialism. At the time Third World
countries were becoming more and more
assertive and used the international fora
to express their collective demand for a
new dialogue and, consequently, for
North-South relations of a different kind.
The first
Lome convention
The EEC then made the proposal to
negotiate a system for stabilizing export
earnings. A year and a half of tight dis-
cussion culminated in the first Lome
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Convention signed on February 28
1975 in the capital of Togo by the nine
countries of the EEC(2) and by forty-six
ACP states (37 African countries, 6 from
the Caribbean and 3 from the Pacific). It
is worth noting that the ACP countries
as a whole presented a united front to
the European Community.
This Lome Convention, which was
signed for a period of five years, aimed ”to
establish close development cooperation
on a basis of complete equality between
partners, and in a spirit of international sol-
idarity”. Its scope covered all fields of
commercial, industrial and technical coop-
eration. Three areas predominated :
 free access to the EEC market for
99,2% of ACP exports, without com-
pulsory reciprocal arragements
(since the ACP countries were not
obliged to offer any counterpart in
terms of free access of EEC imports
to their markets).
 implementation of a system for stabi-
lizing export earnings -called
STABEX- from twelve basic com-
modities, as well as a special
arrangement for sugar.
 the setting up of a committee for
industrial cooperation.
Limitations
of the system
The original spirit of the Lome
Convention could be described as a
willingness on the part of both parties
to treat each other as equal partners,
with an explicit commitment on the
part of the European Community to
strive for the development of the asso-
ciate countries from the South. During
the five years which followed the sig-
nature of the first Lome Accords, one
can say that the system worked 
satisfactorily. Unfortunately, it started to
go awry shortly after the Lome II
Accords were signed in 1979.
In November 1982, three years after
the Lome II Accords, a very critical
assessment was made by the developing
countries. They claimed to be the victims
of renewed protectionnist policies 
directed at them, of deteriorating terms of
trade, and of insufficient credit allocated
by the EEC for upholding commodity
prices.
Nor did STABEX (the stabilization
fund for export earnings) work as the
Lome I Convention intended it to do.
During the EEC/ACP parliamentary
meeting in November 1982, the ACP
countries expressed concern about ”the
lack of sufficient funds, disbursement
delays, and the too narrow range of
products covered by STABEX”.
Nevertheless, no associated ACP
country expressed a desire to leave the
Convention. What is more, Angola and
Mozambique asked to be allowed to
participate in the Lome III negotiations.
In fact, the fundamental problem
remained the part played by Europe in
North-South relations. In other words,
what could be its supportive role in
development policies designed and
implemented by the South countries
themselves ? But the questions remai-
ned unanswered.
During the Lome III negotiations in
1983, two EEC proposals became
stumbling blocks : the issue of develop-
ment policies implemented in ACP
countries, and that of human rights.
These two proposals were perceived
by ACP countries as interference in
their internal affairs. ”You want to copy
the IMF (International Monetary Fund)”,
THE LOME CONVENTION
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(2) The Six, plus the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark.
the ACP countries retorted, ”and impose
your conditions. Beside”, they added,
”your aid is not a gift but a debt since
Europe profits from the aid when the
ACP states import equipment and
know-how from Europe”. Nevertheless,
an agreement was reached to enable
the cooperation to be more efficient and
to speed up agricultural development in
ACP countries so as to enable them to
attain food self-sufficiency.
As far as the human rights issue was
concerned, agreement was finally
reached to widen the concept of human
rights to include the right of people to
feed and house themselves, to work,
etc... The ACP countries took the oppor-
tunity to ask the EEC to see that the sit-
uation of their nationals resident in
Europe be improved. This was an impor-
tant issue in the light of the often
appalling living and working conditions of
immigrants in the European community.
This was indeed a case in point for
ensuring that human rights be respected.
Moreover, the Convention’s limitations
appeared through the EEC’s concern to
protect its own producers of certain
”sensitive” products (such as sugar,
beef, grain, rice, fruit and vegetables,
oils and fats). The ACP countries need
the widest possible access to European
markets in order to obtain the foreign
currency and capital required for their
development and for the reimbursement
of their debt. As for the European
Community, its prime concern is to avoid
implosion by safe-garding the livelihood
of its producers within the framework ot
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
It is quite clear that similar issues
were foremost during negotiations of
the fishery accords with ACP countries
as part of the Common Fisheries Poli-
cy (sometimes known as Blue
Europe)(3). Here again, the shortcom-
ings and contradictions of the EEC’s
development cooperation policy are
brought to light : protectionism when it
comes to admitting fish caught in tropi-
cal waters in competition with fish from
European Community waters, and rede-
ployment of European fleets to the
waters of ACP countries with a view to
avoiding or delaying their restructuring
and resulting lay-offs. We will return to
this point later.
Lome IV
and structural
adjustments
As negotiations for Lome IV got under
way, the majority of ACP countries could
hardly claim that results to date had
lived up to expectations. During-the
course of the previous ten years, the
prices of these countries’ commodities
had fallen by almost 50%. From 1986 to
1988, for example, Africa had lost 
nearly a quarter of its exports.
A climate of international crisis has 
certainly made this situation worse, but
the spirit of cooperation which had
presided over the birth and implementa-
tion of the first Lome Accords has
allowed itself to be contaminated by the
attitudes and logic of neo-liberalism. Both
STABEX and SYSMIN (aid to the mining
sector) have been renewed within the
Lome IV Accords without much thought
on the part of the European Community
about their negative side-effects.
STABEX, for example, has streng-
thened the single-crop farming systems
inherited from colonial times to the
detriment of food crop development.
The funds ear-marked by STA-
SAMUDRA DOSSIER Nr 4
9
(3) Community fishery policy, comparable to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
BEX as compensation to producers for
the drop in world market prices of their
products generally fail to reach them.
They mainly profit the intermediaries
and multi-nationals. Moreover, STABEX
has always lacked the funds required to
enable it to carry out its role properly.
So, for instance, in 1981, only 53% of
applications were successful ; in 1982,
rather less than 40% of applications
were funded. The share of ACP imports
on the European market has continuously
decreased. It fell from 8% in 1975 to
3,8% in 1987, while the number of ACP
countries rose from 46 in 1975 to 66
under Lome III(4). Agricultural goods
from ACP countries are taxed on the
European market whenever they
compete with products from EC member
states, which leads to considerable
reductions in tariff-free quotas and
consequent erosion of the preferential
treatment granted to ACP states. There
is every reason to believe that the
European single market will reinforce
this tendency from 1993 onwards.
However, the major innovation of
Lome IV is the introduction of support
loans for structural adjustment 
programmes recommended by the IMF
as a solution to the problem of Third
World countries’ debt repayments. This
is a dangerous new avenue for the
European Community as it is likely to
favour those countries which, having
signed an agreement with the IMF and
the World Bank, could be considered to
be ”worthy” potential recipients of EEC
aid. This is despite the fact that the
International Monetary Fund’s drastic
programs have proved to be inefficient,
a failure, and often the cause of serious
human suffering.
Can one therefore speak of Europe’s
aid for the development of the ACP
countries ? Are we not witnessing a turn
of events which could have dire conse-
quences for countries which are already
in deep trouble ? Is not the European
Community once again showing itself to
be a united front of developed countries
intent on imposing its development
model on the poorest countries ?
It is not too difficult to understand why,
by all accounts, the majority of
European Members of Parliament hesi-
tated before signing the 4th Lome
Convention in the early summer of
1990(5).
Do the fishery
Accords have
a future ?
The fishery accords signed by the
European Community and certain ACP
countries need to be viewed in the light
of what has just been said about the
background and history of the Lome
Convention. We will not delve more
deeply here into these accords, but
refer the reader to Sevaly Sen’s indepth
study (see page 15).
However, it may be worthwhile within
this historical overview to pick out some
essential points which can help to
define the spirit and scope of the
Accords.
It should first of all be remembered
that it was not until the signing of 
Lome III in 1983 that the fishery sec-
tor’s activities were included within the
framework of the Convention(6). This
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(4) Under Lome IV, three new countries will be associated with the EC : Namibia, Haïti and the
Dominican Republic.
(5) But only the European Greens voted against the Accords.
(6) Fishery accords were nevertheless signed with Senegal as far back as 1979.
somewhat late development -seven full
years after its inauguration — is clearly
not unconnected with the adoption of
the new Law of the Sea in 1982 and
with the pressing need to find new fish-
ing zones for the North’s industrial
fleets, given the depletion of its home
resources.
This new trend could be justified by
the fact that the great majority of ACP
countries did not have the means to
exploit their own resources, while the
countries of the European Community
possessed highly efficient, but under-
used trawlers. This situation was magni-
fied a little later by the entry of Spain
and Portugal into the European
Community, especially as these coun-
tries possess substantial fishing fleets.
From the point of view of the ACP
governments, the Accords are of con-
siderable interest since they provide
them with the opportunity of acquiring
hard currency quite cheaply for the pur-
pose of repaying part of their foreign
debt. But it should nevertheless be
emphasized that, in return, they have
not always been unduly concerned with
developing their own fishery.
Within the framework of these
accords, the European Community’s
fleets’ interests lie essentially in three
groups of species : tuna, shrimp, and
certain high-value demersal fish. The
reason is that there is strong demand
for these species on European markets,
and that they fetch a high price.
It is true that the European
Community is obliged to pay financial
compensation calculated according to
the weight of catches, and to allocate
another sum for fisheries research pro-
grams, training and studies, and partici-
pation in international conferences. The
Accords also provide for employment of
ACP nationals on board EC fishing ves-
sels for training purposes.
The problem is that there is presently
no information available on the extent to
which the European Community fleet
respect the Accords’ provisions. This is
due to the inadequate monitoring facili-
ties in ACP countries. What is certain is
that small-scale fishing is hampered by
the encroachments of industrial trawlers
on their fishing grounds, destroying
their gear and sometimes causing fatal-
ities among their crews. It should how-
ever be noted that such pillage can be
attributed just as much to local industri-
al vessels as to EC vessels.
The Lome Accords provide aid for
research aimed at facilitating fish stock
assessment and management by ACP
countries. But this research is usually
steered towards meeting commercial
objectives instead of achieving more
rational stock management as a means
of ensuring its sustainability. Besides
which, research on stocks of interest to
smale-scale fisheries does not concern
the EC for the simple reason that they
are not considered to have any com-
mercial value.
It should also be mentioned that the
fishery Accords are signed by very
diverse interest groups : the European
Community, ACP governments, EC
fleet owners, the local industrial fishery,
as well as smale-scale fisheries when
they are represented which is not
always the case. Each group attempts
to get the best possible deal, often at
the expense of the others. This goes a
long way towards explaining why the
fishery Accords are not negotiated with
a view to medium and longterm fish-
eries development. The guiding princi-
pale where the EC fleets are con-
cerned is predominantly the realization
of quick profits without regard for the
promotion of local fishermen or the
future of local populations. This will
most likely be the case also with the
new fishery Accords which the European
SAMUDRA DOSSIER Nr 4
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Community intends to sign with non-
ACP countries such as India, Argentina,
and Chile...
Of course, the fishery Accords
between the European Community and
ACP countries are not all negative.
Even so, apart from the fact that the
Accords must be considered first and
foremost as commercial ventures, it 
is also a fact that their number is
declining. In June 1990, only seven
Accords had been signed between the
EEC and the ACP countries. These were
Gui-nea-Conakry, Mozambique, Cape
Verde, the Seychelles, Angola, Senegal
and Côte d’Ivoire. What is more, only
the agreement signed with the 
last-named is a new one, the six others
being renewals.
Is it possible that the ACP countries
are fed up with the observation that the
Accords persistenly lead to over-fishing
of their stocks without providing them
with the proper means to develop their
own fisheries ?
François BELLEC
Translated from French by James Smith.
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FISHERIES
AGREEMENTS WITH AFRICAN
CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC STATES
By Sevaly SEN
Fisheries Scientist
THEIR LIKELY IMPACT ON ARTISANAL FISHERIES
This paper endeavors to provide a brief background to the current
European Community (EC) fisheries agreements with ACP (African
— Caribbean — Pacific) states, their provisions relevant to the
development of artisanal(1) fisheries, the likely effects of the 
agreements on the fishery and the interest groups who influence
fisheries development policy at the national and the international
level. The paper concentrates on ACP countries in Africa, because
all EC-ACP fisheries agreements, with the exclusion of one country
(Dominica), have been concluded with African states.
Recommendations are made as to how Lome IV can help develop future
EC-ACP fisheries agreements which take into consideration, and bring
about, beneficial impacts to the artisanal fisheries sector in ACP states.
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(1) There is no standard definition of artisanal (small-scale) fisheries. An industrial fishery in one coun-
try may be considered an artisanal fishery in another. For the purposes of this paper, the definition
for artisanal fisheries is as follows :
Artisanal implies a non-industrial mode of life in which the producers are directly and knowledgeably
related to production. By virtue of their limited fishing range and a host of socio-economic charac-
teristics, artisanal fisheries are confined to a narrow strip of land and sea round their community, are
faced with a limited set of options, if any, both in terms of fishing grounds and non-fishing investment
opportunities and are intrinsically dependent on local resources.
This has been based on definitions used by D.K. Emmerson (’Rethinking Artisanal Fisheries
Development : Western concepts, Asian Experiences’, World Bank Staff Working Paper N°. 423,
October 1980.) and T. Panayotou (’Management Concepts for Small-scale Fisheries : Economic and
Social Aspects’ FAO Fisheries Technical Paper N°. 228, Rome 1982.
The Agreements
The Principles Underlying
Fisheries Agreements
The principles that underlie EC 
fisheries agreements are contained in
the provisions on Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZs) in the United Nations
Law of the Sea Convention (UNLOSC).
Under this Convention, a coastal state
has sovereign rights over the exploitation,
conservation and management of the
non-living and living resources up to 200
miles from the baselines from which the
territorial sea is measured(2).
The emergence of EEZ’s has meant
that a major redistribution of resource
wealth has taken place. Many poorer
countries have gained sovereignty over
resources they do not have the immediate
capacity to harvest whilst many richer
developed countries with distant water
fleets are willing to pay to gain access to
this resource. Many coastal states in the
ACP region have benefitted from this
change in juridiction, whilst EC distant
water fleets have had their free access to
fishing grounds severely curtailed.
Under the UNLOSC, coastal states are
required to promote the objective of 
optimum utilization of the living resources
in their EEZ’s(3) by determining the 
allowable catch, their own capacity to 
harvest, and the surplus, when they do
not have the capacity to harvest the entire
allowable catch(4). Granting access of the
surplus is not automatic but is the result of
negotiation and conclusion of other 
agreements or arrangements(5).
ACP Choices
on Granting Access
There are three broad choices, (none
of which are mutually exclusive) open to
an ACP coastal State with surplus fish
resources :
(1) prohibit or discourage any foreign
participation
(2) grant access to wholly-foreign 
operations (licensing)
(3) permit foreign access only in associ-
ation with national partners (joint
ventures) or national operations.
The decision which a coastal state
finally makes is subject to many factors,
one of the most important of which is
government policy regarding the 
development of its own fishery.
ACP states that grant access to foreign
vessels tend to utilize a combination of
(2) and (3). EC agreements with ACP
states fall under category (2).
Fisheries in ACP States
Fisheries in ACP states are characterized
by their general diversity and significant 
differences from one country to the next.
Appendix 1 provides general statistical
data, where available, on the fisheries of
African ACP states with which the EC has
or is negotiating agreements. The data
includes estimates for the potential marine
catch which contribute to the determination
of surplus catch available to foreign vessels.
Broadly speaking, fisheries in ACP
States are characterized by a low level
THE LOME CONVENTION
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(2) Articles 55 — 57, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Publication,
New-York, 1983.
(3) Article 62, para 1, ibid.
(4) Article 61, para 1, and Article 61, para 2, ibid.
(5) Article 62, ibid.
of industrialization with the majority of
the fish supply coming from the 
artisanal sector. In general, the artisanal
fishery consists of very many small
units, often employs large numbers of
people (in catching, processing, 
marketing sectors and related trades)
and is often the major supplier of fish,
and sometimes the only supplier of
cheap animal protein, to rural and urban 
populations. In some countries, where
there is great population pressure on
land combined with growing landlessness
and/or little opportunity in land based 
sectors, artisanal fisheries tend to 
provide an open access resource of the
last resort and acts as a safety valve for
surplus labour.
In Africa, fish consumption per capita
varies from country to country, being
highest in Sierra Leone and Sao Tome
and Principe and lowest in Somalia. Full
time employment in the artisanal and
industrial sector similarly varies, as
does the importance of the sector in the
national economy.
Some ACP countries look at fisheries
as their main opportunity to develop and
diversify their economies, particularly
where few alternative opportunities
exist. Countries in this category include
Mauritania and Angola. Other countries
enjoy a wider choice of options and may
not regard fisheries as the most impor-
tant in this respect, particularly when
their estimated marine production
potential is low. Countries in this cate-
gory include Kenya and the Ivory Coast.
Globally, the countries of the CECAF
(Fishery Committee of the Eastern
Central Atlantic) region(6) are conside-
red to be potentially the greatest bene-
ficiaries of the extension of juridiction
and declaration of EEZ’s. Total catch of
the non-African fleets (including 
non-EC vessels) in the CECAF region
in 1986 was just under 1,4 million
tonnes, roughly 46 % of all catches
and reflecting a decline in recent
years. (68% in 1977, 55% in 1979 and
57% in 1982)(7). This represents a real
decline in their catches as total catch in
this region has been rising slowly, thus
also indicating that national fleets are
increasing their share of total catch.
However, almost all stocks of fish
caught in this region are considered
over-exploited or approaching 
over-exploitation.
The policy of granting licenses to 
foreign fleets (both distant water and of
neighbouring countries) is seen as a 
provisional situation by CECAF countries,
and a first step in the process of national
development. The medium term objective
of these countries is to develop a national
fleet capable of optimal exploitation of the
fishery resources in their EEZ. Foreign
fishing fleet activity concentrates mainly in
the Northern Zone, adjacent to low-popu-
lated areas (Mauritania, Western Sahara)
or economically weak countries (Guinea
Bissau).
EC Competence on Fisheries
Agreements with ACP States
In November 1976, competence for
the negotiation of bilateral and multilat-
eral fisheries agreements was 
transferred by the individual member
states to the European Community.
SAMUDRA DOSSIER Nr 4
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(6) Includes 20 independent developing coastal countries (Morocco through to Zaire) with nearly 10.000
km of coastline between Cape Spartel and the Congo River. The richest grounds are located main-
ly in the sub-Sahara portion of the Northern Zone in particular along the coasts of Western Sahara,
Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry.
(7) CECAF ’Elements for an Analysis of the Economic Impact of Foreign Fleets on the Economies of
Coastal Countries in the CECAF Area’ CECAF/FD/88/Inf.9 November 1988 12 pp.
EC Member States may no longer
negotiate fisheries agreements with
third states independently nor 
participate in their own capacity in 
international fishery organizations(8).
EC Fisheries Agreements with
ACP States
All agreements between the Community
and ACP states are financial compensa-
tion agreements. This means access to
Community vessels is granted, provided
financial compensation is paid to the
coastal state. These agreements are 
characterized by additional compensation
in terms of technical or economic 
cooperation to further the development of
the country’s fishing capacity and/or
improve knowledge about fishery
resources in their EEZ’s. The duration of
agreements varies from one to five years.
The first EC agreement with an ACP
state was signed in 1979, with Senegal.
Further agreements were concluded
with Guinea Bissau (1980), Guinea
(1983), Equatorial Guinea (1983), Sao
Tome and Principe (1984), Madagascar
(1986), Seychelles (1987), Gambia
(1987), Angola (1987), Mozambique
(1987), Mauritania (1987), Dominica
(1987), Mauritius (1988) and Comoros
(1988). Many of the more recent agree-
ments were concluded once Spain and
Portugal has acceded to the Commu-
nity in 1986. This is because these
countries, particulary Spain, had already
concluded a number of bilateral fisheries
agreements with ACP States (eg.
Mauritania, Angola) prior to joining the EC,
of which competence had now been trans-
ferred. The dates of entry into force of these
agreements are given in Appendix 2.
The EC Council has also instructed
the Commission to begin negotiations
with Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Saint
Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda. Directives
have been issued to initiate negotia-
tions with Sri Lanka, Maldives, Djibouti,
Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone
and Ivory Coast.
Types of the Agreements
Although EC fisheries agreements
with ACP states follow a similar format,
the provisions do depend upon the
importance accorded to the fishery sec-
tor in an ACP state. Based on the differ-
ent emphasis given to the development
of fisheries sector, the agreements can
be categorised as follows :
 Type 1 Agreements
The majority of agreements fall under
this category. These agreements are
with states that are interested in devel-
oping their own fishing industries and
may already have a skilled and estab-
lished fishing fleet (industrial, semi-
industrial and/or artisanal). Agreements
with Senegal, Mozambique and Guinea
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(8) Although the EC has competence to negotiate on behalf of its member governments for access
rights, a private fishing company in an EC state is also able to negotiate its own access agreements
with a coastal state. These agreements are not subject to the same obligations and remain outside
the conditions imposed on EC vessels under EC-ACP fisheries agreements, unless otherwise stat-
ed. Private agreements may be concluded in order to avoid the more lengthy bureaucratic proce-
dures of the EC or to prevent the EC from having to recognize a situation which is contrary to its fish-
eries development policy. A private agreement may be favoured by some ACP states because unlike
payments received from EC agreements, they may not have to be funnelled through official govern-
ment channels. One drawback for the foreign compagny may be that their compensation offered can
never be on the same scale as those made by the EC, which could lead to discrimination.
The number of private agreements between ACP and EC fishing companies is not known and there-
fore their importance is difficult to gauge.
Conakry are included in this category.
Because fisheries is considered an
important sector in the national econo-
my, these countries try to conclude
agreements which maximize the contri-
butions that directly benefit the long term
viability of their own fishing industry.
 Type 2 Agreements
These agreements are generally with
states that do not accord a high develop-
ment priority to the fisheries sector either
because they regard other sectors of the
economy more deserving of investment,
or they lack the capital and skills neces-
sary, or because they have an estimated
low marine resource potential but lie in
the path of migrating tuna. Many of
these countries may have an active arti-
sanal fishery. Agreements with Sao
Tome and Principe and the Comoros are
included in this category. These coun-
tries try to negotiate agreements which
maximize financial benefits.
 Fisheries Agreements,
ACP States and
the Lome Conventions
The importance of fisheries in terms
of development, food security and EC
fleet access, is reflected in the provi-
sions on fisheries in successive Lome
Conventions. The recognition of the
importance of fisheries is partly attribut-
able to the conclusion of the UNLOSC
in 1982 and the widespread declaration
of national EEZ’s which occurred in the
late 1970’s and early 1980’s.
The First Lome Convention signed in
1975 contained a short Annex on fish-
eries in which the Community stated
its’ willingness to encourage the deve-
lopment of fisheries and related indus-
tries in ACP states within the framework
of financial and technical cooperation
activities. ACP states declared their will-
ingness to negotiate with any Member
State bilateral agreements ”likely to
guarantee satisfactory conditions in the
fishery activities in the sea waters with-
in their juridiction”.
The Second Lome Convention,
signed in 1979, also contained an
Annex relating to fisheries which was
more detailed than that of the first
Convention. In Annex XVIII, the sover-
eign right of ACP states to determine
policies for the conservation and use of
fishery resources and their willingness
to negotiate mutually satisfactory fishing
agreements on a non-discriminatory
basis with the EC was recognized. The
EC recognized that payments made
under a fishery agreement were addi-
tional to payments out of the European
Development Fund (EDF)(9). In the
same year, the first fisheries agreement
was signed with Senegal.
In the Third Lome Convention, signed
in 1983, fisheries was given special
attention by including it as a new area of
cooperation in the Convention itself(10).
Title II (Article 50) of the Convention
states that the Community and the ACP
states :
“recognize the urgent need to pro-
mote the development of fishery
resources of ACP States both as a con-
tribution towards the development of
fisheries as a whole and... as a sphere
of interest for their respective economic
sectors”(11).
The objectives of the cooperation
between the EC and the ACP States
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(9) Corre, J.M., ”Fishery negotiations in the new Convention- The opening round”, The Courier N° 85,
May-June 1984.
(10) Title II, Article 51, Lome III Convention.
(11) Article 50, Ibid.
are laid out in Article 51 of the
Convention and are as follows :
- encourage the rational exploitation
of the fishery resources of the ACP
States and the resources of the high
seas in which the ACP states and
the Community share interests ;
- increase the contribution of fisheries
to rural development by giving impor-
tance to the role they play in strength-
ening food security, improving nutri-
tion and rural living standards ;
- increase the contribution of fisheries
to industrial development by increas-
ing catches, output and exports.
The Convention also contains provi-
sions on fisheries agreements, whereby
the parties declare their willingness to
negotiate fishery agreements aimed at
entering mutually satisfactory condi-
tions with no discrimination against the
Community. Both parties also supported
moves for a more regionalized
approach for access agreements.
Although EC fisheries agreements are
essentially commercial agreements
between the ACP state and the EC, the
provisions of the current Lome Convention
have to be taken into account during nego-
tiations to ensure that there is no conflict
between the EC fisheries development
policy and the agreements. This is likely to
lead to compromise in certain situations. A
staff member from the Directorate-General
for Development (DGVIII) attends all 
fisheries agreement negotiations between
Fisheries Division (DGXIV) and ACP
States in order to safeguard the interests
and concern of that division.
 Terms of the Agreements
This paper does not intend to exam-
ine the provisions in detail, but to
highlight provisions that are likely to
have a direct or indirect effect on the
artisanal fishery of the ACP state. These
likely effects are then discussed in detail
in Section 3.
 Recent Trends
Over the last ten years, since the first
agreement was signed with Senegal,
the terms and conditions of all EC 
fisheries agreements have become
more specific and exacting. This has
been due to the following reasons :
1. increased global awareness of the
importance of fisheries management
and conservation. Increased interest
in fisheries management has
received further impetus through the
change in the legal regime of the
seas which has in principle improved
the chances of effective resource
management(12).
2. the realization by ACP states of the
strength of their negotiating position
because of the value of their fisheries to
traditional distant water fishing nations,
worst hit by the declaration of EEZ’s;
3. a growing awareness in many devel-
oping coastal states of the impor-
tance of their fisheries sector in
terms of national development and
the need to control activities of 
foreign vessels in order ensure
greater benefits to the coastal state.
 The Provisions
The fisheries agreements signed
between the EC and ACP states follow
a particular pattern. The agreement
specifies the principles and rules which
regulate the fishing activities of
Community vessels, with detailed con-
ditions, including lincense fees, attached
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(12) Lawson, R. and Robinson, M., Artisanal fisheries in West Africa: ”Problems of management imple-
mentation”, Marine Policy, October 1983.
as an Annex to the agreement. A
Protocol, often of a shorter duration,
establishes fishing opportunities (i.e.
the number and type of vessels) as well
as the financial compensation 
payments and any other contributions
the EC has undertaken to pay.
Compensation and contributions are
paid regardless of whether any licenses
are taken up by EC member States
under the terms of the Agreement.
 Obligations
of the Community Vessels
The numbers of vessels by type is either
based on a total Gross Registered
Tonnage (GRT) up to a maximum number
of vessels or simply fixed at a certain 
number of vessels by type. Licenses fees,
a proportion of which is payable in
advance, are set according to the quantity
of fish caught or the GRT of the vessel.
— Licenses
All agreements contain provisions for the
licensing of tuna vessels although not all
countries license all three types (purse
seiners, pole and line and longliners). This
depends upon the tuna species which are
available in their coastal waters. According
to the EC, tuna licenses are 100‰ 
subscribed, but information on numbers of
vessels is not available. Because tuna are
highly migratory species observing no
national boundaries, Community tuna 
vessels wish to obtain tuna licenses in
waters of all ACP states which have 
concluded agreements. By gaining access
to these waters the vessels are then able
to follow the tuna. The EC wishes to gain
access to all waters around the African
continent to allow continuity of activity for
their tuna vessels.
Most states also issue licenses for 
demersal finfish trawlers and/or shrimp
trawlers (including deep water shrimps),
or the agreements have provisions which
enable them to do so after negotiation.
Only the agreement with Mauritania,
which has a large pelagic stock, contains
specific provision for pelagic purse 
seiners. Information on the number of
licenses issued was not available.
According to the EC, shrimp trawler
licenses are completely subscribed.
Finfish trawler licenses are not 
completely subscribed, and depend on
the resources of the ACP state. However,
since Spain joined the EC, the number of
finfish licenses taken up have increased.
Thus, based on the terms of the 
agreements, EC fleets have three main
catching interests : tuna, shrimp and
high-value demersal fish. These are
species which are in demand in EC
member States, as well as commanding
high prices on world markets.
— Fishing Zones
The agreements specify fishing zones
where Community vessels are permitted
to fish. These zones are usually intended
for protection of the inshore artisanal 
fishery, but also, occasionally, for security 
reasons. Different fishing zones are 
prescribed for different vessel types.
Currently, under the agreements, fishing is
permitted in zones ranging from 2 nautical
miles (Madagascar) to 25 nautical miles
for tuna longliners (Senegal) from base-
lines from which the territorial sea is meas-
ured. More defined areas where fishing is
allowed, is specified in some agreements,
eg. agreements with the Seychelles and
Mauritania. Often, different zones are
specified for different vessel types. For
example, the 1987 agreement with
Guinea Conakry states that fishing is per-
mitted beyond 3 nautical miles for shrimp
vessels not exceeding 135 GRT, 6 nautical
miles for shrimp vessels between 135-300
GRT, 12 nautical miles for shrimp vessels
over 300 GRT, 15 nautical miles for cepha-
SAMUDRA DOSSIER Nr 4
21
lopod vessels and 15 nautical miles for
finfish trawlers.
In the agreement with the Seychelles
(1988)(13), by request of the Seychelle
negotiators, specific mention is made,
for the first time, of protecting the 
interests of the artisanal fishery :
“To avoid any adverse effects on small-
scale fisheries in Seychelles’ waters,
fishing by Community tuna vessels shall
not be authorized in the zones defined
in Annex III, nor within three miles
around any fish aggregating devices
placed by the Seychelles authorities.”
— Employment of Nationals
Agreements also include provisions on
employment of nationals on board EC
vessels to provide vocational training.
The terms of these provisions vary, for
some countries it is mandatory to take
on board national fishermen (eg.
Seychelles) but for others it is not com-
pulsory (eg. Mozambique). In most
agreements, where no nationals are
available, the vessel owner is obliged to
pay a proportion of the wage that a
national would have received to the
authorities, to enable the training of a
national fishermen (eg. Angola,
Mauritania). In all agreements, govern-
ment officials must be allowed on board
to undertake inspection and monitoring,
but again the conditions differ. For some
countries the official should only be
allowed on board for the time taken to
carry out his/her duties (eg. Sao Tome
and Principe, Seychelles) whilst for
other countries an observer has to be
taken on board for an unspecified
amount of time (eg. shrimp trawlers in
Mozambique, Guinea Conakry).
— Statement of Catch
All agreements contain provisions
requiring EC vessels to make catch
statements submitted to the national
authorities after a fixed period of time,
usually every 3 months.
— Landing of Catch
and By-catch
Provisions on the landing of catch vary
in each agreement. In most cases, EC
vessels are not obliged to land any of
their catch in the ACP state. States that
are actively interesed in developing
their domestic processing industry (i.e.
Senegal) and states that wish to
increase their domestic fish supply (i.e.
Equatorial Guinea and Guinea Bissau)
make it a condition for Community ves-
sels (other than tuna vessels) that a cer-
tain proportion of the catch is landed in
the state. Agreements with Angola,
Guinea Bissau and Mozambique also
contain provisions on the landing of by-
catch, which becomes the property of
the state and must be landed in that
country.
Penalties for infringements of the provi-
sions set out in the agreements range
from the imposition of a fine to the revo-
cation of the license.
— EC Obligations
The EC pays financial compensation to the
Central Bank of the ACP State in return for
access rights to their surplus fisheries
resources. The compensation is usually
calculated on a certain weight of catch. This
is purely a commercial transaction, the use
of which is wholly at the discretion of the
recipient. Payment is made from funds al-
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(13) Annex 1, Part 7, Agreement between the European Community and Republic of Seychelles on fish-
ing off the Seychelles, OJ L 160/1/87, June 20, 1987.
located under the Common Fisheries
Policy, which are entirely separate to funds
allocated under the Lome Convention.
The first EC agreement (Senegal, 1979)
requested a programme of use for the
funds, but this was later abandoned for all
others agreements because it proved
unworkable. It should be emphasized that
there is no obligation whatsoever on the
ACP state to utilize these funds in a 
particular way. The funds can be equated
to export earnings from any other sector,
and the onus lies on the coastal state to
decide how best to utilize them.
There are also ”cooperation 
provisions” which encompass the spirit
of Lome. Under these provisions, which
vary from state depending on their
requirements, the EC contibutes a
specified amount for the development
of fishery research programmes and
provision of training and study grants for
nationals for study of fishery related
subjects and/or participation at 
international conferences. The 
contributions, which usually amount to 
approximately 10% of the value of the
financial compensation, also enable the
fisheries department to have access to
some of the financial benefits of the
agreement.
Fulfillment of Obligations
No information is available on the
extent to which EC vessels adhere to the
provisions of the agreements. To some
extent, the more recent agreements have
corrected the more unworkable provisions
of earlier agreements. However, the 
limited or nonexistent surveillance and
enforcement systems in most ACP
states, means that infringements possibly
go unreported or unnoticed. Artisanal
fishermen may not be aware that they
can report vessels violating fishing zone
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restrictions or that there is any 
legislation which prevents industrial
vessels from fishing in inshore waters.
Governments may also have not set up
a system which enables local fishermen
to report violations.
Equally, EC vessels find some of the
provisions difficult to respect. A
requirement to radio their position may be
very difficult to heed because the ACP
country does not have equipment which is
in operation, nevertheless the vessel may
be subject to a fine. There have also been
complaints about harassment of vessels
by unauthorized government officials.
Surveillance
and Enforcement
The responsibility for surveillance and
enforcement lies with the coastal state
and not the flag state. In other words, any
infringements made by EC vessels in
ACP states’ waters should be penalized
by the ACP state. Many of the problems
associated with foreign fishing vessels
could be prevented by the implementation
of an effective surveillance and monitoring
system. This is usually very difficult for
most ACP states. Until, an effective 
surveillance system is put into operation,
not just to prevent illegal activities, but to
collect data on catch and effort ; there is
no incentive for foreign vessels to heed
unenforceable provisions of a fisheries
agreement.
The EC feels that this responsibility lies
with the ACP states and are unwilling
to provide the necessary equipment
because it may be used for other 
purposes. It has also been suggested
that the financial compensation 
payments should be used for this 
purpose. In Mauritania, the IMF/World
Bank Structural Readjustment
Programme, made it a condition of funding
that some of the payments received from
fisheries agreements are invested into
an effective fisheries monitoring and
surveillance system.
Impact of EC Activities
on Artisanal
Fisheries
Introduction
The impact of EC fisheries 
agreements on artisanal fishing com-
munities is difficult to quantify because
information is limited, the situation in
each country is different, and fisheries
communities are extremely diverse. It is
also difficult because most of the 
agreements have only recently been
concluded and it is still too early to
ascertain their effects, particulary where
the short term effects may be negligible
but the long term effects deeper and
more far-reaching.
This report can therefore only identify
likely areas of impact. Actual impact
should then be assessed from 
information collected over a period of
time. Other fishery development 
experiences where similar situations have
arisen can act as a base for comparison,
taking into consideration that there may
be fundamental differences in situation.
However, to enable a thorough
impact assessment, the scope of any
analysis should be broadened.
Artisanal fishing communities in ACP
states are not only threatened by the
activities of EC fishing fleets, but by all
industrial fishing vessels, whether they
are national or foreign. Successful
implementation of policies to prevent
harmful effects on these communities
must include all industrial vessels and
should not undertake a piecemeal 
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approach. In some cases encroach-
ments of national vessels, which are
less seaworthy than foreign fleets,
because they have a more limited 
fishing area, may be a bigger threat to
the artisanal fishery than foreign fleets.
The following discussion looks at the
areas where detrimental or negative
impacts are likely to occur.
Fishing Grounds
and Resources
 Common Fishing Grounds
and Common Resources
Artisanal fisheries appear to be 
suffering increasingly from the incursions
of larger vessels (mainly trawlers) into
coastal areas reserved for the small-scale
fishery. Although often prohibited by law
(eg. zoning provisions in EC agreements),
these incursions are motivated by a 
number of factors. These include the
presence of high value species (eg.
shrimp), the higher fish densities in 
shallow waters characteristic of tropical
ecosystems, increasing fuel costs and
limited or non-existent government
enforcement of regulations. For example,
finfish trawlers in Cameroon are 
supposed to be at least 3,2 km off the
estuaries, but available data indicates that
they concentrate their fishing activities in
the coastal sector resulting in conflicts
between the two sectors(14).
Artisanal fishermen are the more vul-
nerable, because alternative fishing
grounds cannot be reached by their
shorter range vessels. This dislocation is
especially of concern when no alterna-
tive employment opportunities exist for
small-scale fishermen and their families.
Tuna vessels, which fish using live
bait, could be competing for resources
also fished by artisanal fishery. This
could be detrimental to the artisanal
fishing community if the fish used as live
bait is also a food or income source.
However, if the live bait has no other
use, it could also be beneficial to the
artisanal sector, if the tuna vessels rely
on this sector to supply live bait, for
cash.
 Common Fishing Grounds,
Different Resources
In some instances, open competition
occurs despite the fact that the artisanal
and industrial fisheries are exploiting 
different resources. For example, in West
Africa the target species for many 
artisanal fishermen are pelagic fish,
whereas the target species of the industri-
al vessels may be shrimp or demersal fish
such as croakers, grunts and seabreams.
Competition between fisheries occurs
because in most tropical ecosystems
there is species interdependence and
geographical mixing. The relative abun-
dance of different species can change
dramatically, and the rise or fall of one
species can be influenced by the
degree of exploitation of other species.
Trawl fisheries tend to take more
species incidentally (by-catch) than do
artisanal fishermen, which can cause
losses to the artisanal fishery in terms
of reduced stock abundance. Some
ACP states, (for example, Angola and
Mozambique) have insisted in their
fisheries agreement with the EC, that
all by-catch of shrimp trawlers is landed
in the country. Even where there is no
direct overlap, it can not be assumed
there will be no interaction and con-
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(14) Ssentongo, G.W. and Njock, J.C., Marine Fishery Resources of Cameroon : A review of exploited
stocks, Rome, FAO CECAF/ECAF Series 87/44, 1987.
flicts between the two fisheries will not
occur.
Examples of this kind of conflict are well
documented for Asia(15). In Kerala, India,
by the end of the 1970’ s, small-scale 
artisanal fishermen were faced with
declining productivity and hampered
access to inshore waters due to shrimp
trawler operations. They started 
organized protest which led to zoning 
recommendations, yet to be 
implemented. In the interim, artisanal 
fishermen, collectively apprehend
trawlers/ purse seiners violating the zoning
regulations and force the Government and
policie authorities to take legal action(16).
In Indonesia, the expansion of 
commercial trawling for shrimp in the
1960’s and ‘70’ s primarily for export
contributed to over exploitation of
inshore demersal fishery resources.
Small-scale artisanal fishermen were at
a disadvantage in competing with the
trawlers. This competition between the
two fisheries led to severe conflict. In
response, the government proclaimed
measures for sustainable management
of the fishery resources and for providing
protection for the small-scale fishermen,
including restrictions on the number of
trawlers and their area of operations.
However, enforcement proved difficult
(lack of personnel and equipment, 
political influence exerted by trawler
owners, lack of clear enforcement 
possibilities) and there was a 
continuing increase in the number of
trawlers, with conflicts becoming more
widespread and violent. In 1980, the
president enacted a decree which
banned all trawlers from the waters off
Java and Sumatra. Although this
caused short term dislocation problems
in the industrial fisheries sector, the long
term benefits to the fishery as a whole,
particulary the artisanal sector, may be
significant(17).
 Sequential Fisheries
Competition between the industrial and
artisanal fishery sector also arises when
the same resource is exploited by each
sector at different stages in its life cycle
(sequential fisheries). One of the best
studies of a sequential fishery has been
on the penaeid shrimp(18). In summary,
the unique biological characteristics of
penaeid shrimp means that in many 
fishing grounds the species go through
two exploitative phases. They spawn at
sea and the larvae migrate into nurseries
in lagoons and river mouths where they
spend 3-4 months prior to migrating back
into the sea. They are first caught at the
time of their migration from the lagoons
and river mouths to the sea, mainly
through the use of fixed nets set up by
artisanal fishermen. Once at sea the
shrimp are exploited by specialized
trawlers. Stock assessments suggest that
the artisanal fishery may harvest individu-
als when they are too young and the
combined yield of the artisanal and indus-
trial fishery can often be slightly increased
by reducing the artisanal catch.
In the Ivory Coast, this has led to the
disappearance of the trawl fleet as the
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ermen’s organizations in fisheries management. The role of fishermen’s organizations in fisheries
management of developing countries (with particular reference to the Indo-Pacific region)’ FAO
Fisheries Tech. Pap. (300) : 29-48, Rome, 1988.
(16) Kurien, J., ibid.
(17) Kurien, J., ibid.
(18) Willmann, R. and S.M Garcia, ’A bio-economic model for the analysis of sequential artisanal and
industrial fisheries for tropical shrimp’, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (270) : 49pp, 1985.
increasing artisanal fishing effort 
progressively reduced the recruitment of
shrimp to the offshore fishery affecting
catch rates and therefore profitability(19).
Destruction of Artisanal
Fishing Gear
Industrial vessels have also been
known to destroy stationary artisanal
gear when they make their passages
through inshore waters. In the non-motor-
ized artisanal fishery, fishing gear (such
as beach seines and stationary gill nets),
is often the largest investment a fisher-
man has to make in order to enter the
fishery. Even in the motorized artisanal
fishery, investment in fishing gear is usu-
ally large component of total capital out-
lay for the fishermen. Destruction of gear
by industrial vessels may force the fisher-
men out of the fishery either until he is
able to repair the gear, or in many cases,
replace it. In northern Sierra Leone, a sur-
vey of 38 fishing villages undertaken in
1987(20), revealed that approximately
78% of artisanal fishermen claimed that
they had lost gear to trawlers.
Destruction
of Mangrove Areas by
Coastal Communities
Coastal mangrove areas which fulfil a
role in coastal protection are critical 
habitats for many common and endangered
species and are important spawning and
nursery grounds for many marine fish and
prawns. In addition, they are an important
source of wood for charcoal and firewood
used for cooking and fish smoking.
Coastal communities put pressure on the
mangrove resource in two main ways :
mangroves are cut to be used as firewood
for fish smoking as well as cooking ; also,
their roots are completely severed when
mangrove oysters are removed. As a result
of depletion of mangrove resources by
these communities, serious damage to the
coastal environment can occur causing :
– the destruction of fish breeding and
nursery grounds affecting both the
industrial and the artisanal fishery
– loss of employment and incomes for
firewood collectors and charcoal
burners
– increased production costs of fish
processors to likely reduction or loss
of income
– increased pressure on remaining
mangrove resources
The importance of mangrove resource
utilization and conservation has been
investigated in Sierra Leone(21). The
study found that in some small-scale fish
smoking centres of Sierra Leone, 
mangrove resources were over-exploited
or nearing over-exploitation. It was pre-
dicted that, unless these resources were
managed effectively, there would be far-
reaching detrimental socio-economic
and environmental consequences.
Price
The national fishery may benefit from
the introduction of an industrial sector
which stimulates a higher demand for
fish if the industrial catch is landed in
the coastal state. This may lead to high-
er prices and consequently higher
SAMUDRA DOSSIER Nr 4
27
(19) Willmann and Garcia, ibid.
(20) Beare, R., Survey of the Fishing Communities of the Northwestern Region of Sierra Leone, Kambia
Fisheries Development Project Technical Report 3/87, 1987.
(21) UNDP/FAO, Alleviation of Fuelwood Supply Shortage in the Western Area. Proposed Management
and integrated utilization of mangrove resource in Sierra Leone. Based on the work of P.W. Chong,
UNDP/FAO/SIL/84/003, Field Document Freetown, 1987, 123 pp.
incomes for artisanal fishermen. However,
an increase in the supply of fish may also
cause prices of fish to fall because a 
supply glut brings prices down. The effect
on price will therefore depend on the 
situation in each country. In some states,
the artisanal fishery sector and the 
industrial fishery sector compete in 
different markets in terms of location,
income, species and preferences.
Therefore, much depends on whether the
two fleets are fishing the same resource,
whether they are competing in the same
markets and the influence of imports of
cheap fish from neighbouring countries.
Landing, Processing and
Marketing Infrastructure
The development of an industrial 
fishery, either brought about by the 
presence of foreign vessels or a building
of the national fleet can lead to improved
landing, processing and marketing 
structure. This could be beneficial to the
artisanal fishing community, provided
these facilities were made available to
them. Improved ice-making, landing,
storage and distribution facilities may
mean that the artisanal fishery is able to
improve the quality of its landed catch,
broaden its marketing network and
increase sales. This could lead to
increased incomes and employment in
artisanal fishing communities. On the
other hand, the development of an 
industrial fleet and consequent shore-
based infrastructure may have the effect
of increasing landings of the industrial
fleet at the expense of the artisanal sector.
Employment and Incomes
The development of an industrial 
fishing sector in an ACP state which
reduces the fish stocks available for the
artisanal fishery may also have an
adverse effect on employment and hou-
sehold income in artisanal fishing 
communities (in all sectors : catching,
processing, marketing and related
trades), particularly where little opportu-
nity exists for alternative employment. In
countries where there is high rural-urban
migration, this may have an even more
detrimental socio-economic impact as
displaced fishing families leave their
communities to find work in urban areas.
Equally, fishermen may leave the
artisanal sector to become crew 
members on industrial fishing vessels.
This may have socio-economic implica-
tions for the artisanal fishing community,
particulary if a significant number of 
fishermen leave and reduced fishing
activity has decreased overall protein
supply and/or increased the price of fish.
Food Supply
If most of the fish caught by industrial
vessels, foreign or national, is destined
for export, this may have a detrimental
effect on national protein supply. This
situation could be worsened if the
industrial vessels are fishing the same
resource as the artisanal fleet.
Equally, reduced catches in the 
artisanal sector, as a direct result of
increased fishing activity of the 
industrial sector, may have a long term
impact on the nations food security and
in particular, on the nutritional situation
of artisanal fishing communities as well
as neighbouring communities.
Also, if artisanal fishermen begin to
target the same fish caught by the 
industrial sector, for sale to export or
processing industries, the amount of fish
caught for subsistence may be reduced.
A similar situation would arise, as has
happened in the agricultural sector in
many countries of Africa ; where cash
cropping has had harmful effects on the
nutritional situation of the household.
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The bounty of the sea. (Photo P. Gillet)
Fisheries Research
and Training
EC fisheries agreements include 
provisions on fisheries research,
resource assessment and stock 
monitoring which should have a 
beneficial impact on all fisheries sectors
of the ACP state, as both knowledge and
possibilities of management of fish
stocks improve. However, this will 
benefit the artisanal sector provided the
research is management oriented rather
than purely for commercial purposes. In
the latter case, the artisanal fishery 
sector may suffer because research into
the resources commonly exploited by the
sector may not be undertaken as they
are not considered of commercial 
interest. In a multi-species tropical fishery,
this could lead to poor management and
eventual collapse of fish stocks important
to the survival of the artisanal fishery.
EC contributions to enable training of
nationals, particulary government 
officials, can be either beneficial or
detrimental to the artisanal fishery. If a
bias is placed on the study of industrial
fisheries only, this may lead to development
of policies with the same bias.
Management
and Conservation
The benefits which coastal states are
able to derive from their fishery
resources ultimately depend on their
ability to formulate and implement
rational plans for their exploitation and
management. Allowing access to 
foreign fleets who may have no long
term commitment to the conservation of
the nation’s resource may lead to over
exploitation of stocks and subsequent
collapse of the fishery, particularly in
countries where fisheries enforcement
is limited.
Development and management should
be considered simultaneously and
should stem from a long term view of
the improvement of national fisheries as
a whole. The new legal regime of the
oceans has made fisheries manage-
ment easier for coastal states and creat-
ed some limitations on the open access
nature of the resource.
Interest groups
involved
The likely effects of EC fisheries 
agreements on the artisanal fisheries in
ACP states have been identified in
Section 3. However, the development of
fisheries policy in terms of protecting the
interests of the artisanal fishery cannot
be examined simply by identifying these
effects and trying to prevent them, where
they are harmful, and promote them, if
they are beneficial. Policy towards 
fisheries agreements is developed
through negotiation between parties 
representing many interests groups. Each
group is trying to maximize the benefits
that can be extracted from the agreement,
often at the expense of other groups. The
end result is a compromise between
these groups, with the interests of the
more powerful groups better represented.
Therefore, any analysis of the impacts on
the artisanal fishery has to be 
undertaken within the much broader
framework of the political and economic
power wielded by the different groups.
The interaction of these different groups
affects not only fisheries agreement 
negotiations, provisions and implementa-
tion, but also determines the fisheries 
policy of the ACP state which could have
long lasting effects on the artisanal sector.
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For fisheries negotiations between ACP
states and the EC, the following interest
groups have been identified :
ACP Governments
ACP governments may not always have
the interests of the long term sustainable
development of the fishery sector in
mind when negotiating access 
agreements. Financial compensation
payments from the EC may be seen as
a way of alleviating foreign exchange
shortages, debt burden or problems in
other sectors of the economy.
Development of the fisheries sector may
be considered less important than a
number of more pressing issues, and
where local fishermen are not organized
or few in number, politically less impor-
tant than other areas of the economy.
Where governments are interested in
developing their fishery, payments are
often seen as a transitional measure,
which enables the financing of their
national industrial fleet, on-shore 
processing industry, or their fisheries
sector as a whole.
In both cases, their interest is to 
maximize the financial payments the EC
makes to gain access to their fishery
resources. In the latter case, their interest
is also to maximize benefits to their 
nascent industrial fisheries sector as well.
Those states with greater opportunities
to mobilize resources for the develop-
ment of their domestic industry have
placed relatively greater importance on
directing the benefits from foreign fish-
ing access towards the development of
their own domestic fishing industry —
seeking data, market access, technolo-
gy transfer and often investment
through joint ventures. Those states for
whom the constraints of the lack of cap-
ital and skills are more severe, have
generally sought to maximize direct
financial benefits, with development
assistance often taking a secondary
role.
In both cases, the importance of the
artisanal fishery may be subjugated to
the interests of the industrial fishery
and/or other areas of the economy
which have a more powerful lobby.
The European Community
The EC is interested in securing fishing
grounds for its member states in order
to prevent dislocation of its distant water
fishing fleets and related problems of
domestic unemployment. This has
become more important since Spain
acceded to the EC in 1986. EC 
compensation and contribution payments
can be regarded as a subsidy given to the
fishing fleets of member states, and
therefore a short-term solution to a long
term structural problem.
The EC Fisheries Division (DG XIV)
regards these agreements as a method
of crisis management in the fishery sector
of their member states. Their interest is to
maximize the return on their payments by
encouraging all licenses to be taken up.
Provisions on fisheries research and
encouragement of fisheries management
measures are of mutual benefit 
especially if EC fleets are to continue 
fishing in waters of ACP states.
In the long run the EC says it would like to
see more cooperation and less subsidy,
such as joint ventures in the catching or
processing sector. From the EC’ s point of
view this is a sensible policy option,
because global fisheries resources are
finite and therefore valorization of product
will become more important.
For the EC, support for the artisanal
fishery sector is important for two 
reasons. Firstly, under EC development
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policy, priority is given to agricultural
and rural development with an 
emphasis on self-sufficiency and 
secondly, under the broader framework
of the Lome Conventions, the EC must
ensure that there are no conflicts in 
policy between Fisheries and
Development Divisions.
Fisheries Departments
of ACP States
The fisheries departments of ACP states
often lack funds, which prevent them
from undertaking many of their duties.
Departments particulary underfunded,
are found in countries where fisheries is
not considered a priority sector. EC 
contributions to research and study
grants may be the only quantifiable 
benefit that the department receives from
the fisheries agreements and they are
interested in maximizing these benefits.
Apart from providing the department with
some resources, these grants also
enable the department to contribute to
the long term sustainability of their 
country’ s fishery.
Owners and Crew
of Community Vessels
Since the declaration of EEZ’s, distant
water EC vessels are interested in
obtaining access to fishing areas now
under the jurisdiction of coastal states.
Their primary motives for gaining
access is to fish for profit and to protect
their livelihoods. As catch-related
wages are paid to crews, the incentive
is to catch as much high value fish as
possible. Without EC financial 
compensation payments allowing access
to these vessels, it is possible that fishing in
ACP waters would be either unprofitable or
marginal(22). These vessels are interested
in maximizing the benefits of access and
minimizing the costs, such as licence fees
and obligations to land catches.
Because these vessels have no long
term commitment to the fishery, they
may not be concerned about 
conservation and management of the
resource or the disruption of the local
fisheries caused by their activities.
Their interests are represented by the
Fisheries Division (DG XIV) of the EC.
The local industrial fishery
The local industrial fishery, where it
exists, is concerned about protecting
the interests of its fleets, and reducing
competition on resources in a situation
where both foreign and local fleets are
fishing the same resource. Depending
on their political strength, their interest
may be well represented by their 
government at the negotiations. This
group can also regard the existence of a
foreign fleet as a benefit, in terms of
transfer of skills, learning new methods
and development of on-shore infrastruc-
ture. Generally, however, a developing
industrial fleet is likely to regard the
prospects of a long term foreign competi-
tion as a threat and will endeavor to have
strict conditions imposed on these fleets.
In some cases, this sector may enter
joint venture agreements with foreign
fleets. In theory these agreements are
expected to generate large amounts of
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(22) Actual analyses on numbers, costs and revenues of EC vessels fishing in ACP waters is not possi-
ble as data, if available, is confidential.
(23) Willmann and Garcia op cit.
foreign exchange earnings for the ACP
state, but often a considerable share of
profits and incomes derived from these
ventures is transferred to industrialized
countries(23).
The Local Artisanal Fishery
This group is important in terms of the
numbers of people employed and their
dependence on the fishery for subsis-
tence, income and employment.
They therefore wish to minimize the
competition for common fishery
resources in order to protect their liveli-
hoods and incomes. They are threat-
ened by all industrial fishing interests
which exploit the same resources, 
interdependent resources or the same
fishing grounds. Because this group are
often operating near to or on subsistence
level, they are more vulnerable to
adverse changes in the fishery.
Despite the importance of this sector,
their interests are often accorded a low
priority therefore poorly represented. In
addition, because this group, in ACP
states, is charcterized by poor or limited
organization, this contributes to their
poor representation at national and
international level.
Although aid to fisheries development,
given under the Lome Conventions, is
mainly targeted at this sector, interests
of these communities are usually very
badly represented in the provisions of
the fisheries agreements. It was already
been mentioned in Section 2.8.3, that
the EC fisheries agreement with the
Seychelles, is the only agreement to
given specific mention to the interests of
small-scale fisheries.
Third Country States
These include both neighbouring coun-
tries as well as other foreign fleets, eg.
Korea and Japan. It has been argued
that the EC agreements have raised the
overall costs of access to ACP waters for
all third countries. Where a third country
is a developing country, this may limit
the ability of that country to develop its
own fishing fleet. Where two ACP states
are involved, conflicts may arise.
This situation is likely to worsen as
more ACP states develop their own
industrial fleets, particulary their tuna
fleets, where access agreements to the
EEZ’s of many countries have to be
obtained.
The likelihood of trans-boundary dis-
putes over shared stocks between two
or more ACP states could increase if an
access agreement was concluded with
only one state, whilst the other state
was trying to develop its’ own industrial
fishery based partially on these shared
stocks. Although neither Liberia or
Sierra Leone have yet to sign an agree-
ment with the EC, their shrimp stocks
are shared resources and could be an
area for dispute in the future.
Negotiating Positions
for Lome IV
ACP States
The emphasis from ACP states for the
negotiations for Lome IV was on protec-
tion of fishery resources, inclusion of
the development of inland resources(24)
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(24) The Courier, ’Lome IV : the ACP Negotiating Position, Jan-Feb., 1989.
and for more emphasis placed on
resource management and fisheries
development with close cooperation at
every stage. The ACP states would also
like to see changes in the Rules of
Origin provisions for fish and fish 
products. This is explained in more
detail below.
The European Community
The EC is emphasizing the promotion of
transfer of technology (perhaps through
joint ventures) and encouragement of
regional participation in fisheries organ-
izations.
The ”Rule
of Origin” Question
Under the ”Rules of Origin” in the third
Lome Convention, only products of sea
fishing and other products taken from
the sea by an ACP flag or Member
states flag vessel made aboard their
factory ships are eligible to totally free
and unlimited access to EC markets. All
catches from other vessels is excluded
(including fish that are dried, salted, in
brine or smoked) and do not get the 
status of originating products.
The EC does not want to relax these
rules for fish, because they are 
concerned that the fishing fleets of third
countries could gain access to EEC
markets. However, in order to promote
the development of their domestic 
fishing industry, the ACP states have
reaffirmed their position that all catches
from ACP waters and obligatorily landed
in the ports of the ACP states for 
processing should enjoy originating 
status(26).
A Note About
Joint Ventures
Joint ventures are often favoured by
developing countries as a means of
developing their own fishing industry
and by foreign companies seeking
access to third country waters. There
are some ACP states that have joint
venture fishing operations, for example
Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, Guinea
Conakry, Liberia, Ghana, Sierra Leone
and Senegal.
In theory, the joint venture allows the
coastal state to participate according to
its capacities in an industrial enterprise
without having to first master the 
technical and managerial skills needed to
run it. The capacities of local managers
may be increased as a result, allowing
gradually greater participation. There is
also an element of complementarity, the
different skills, costs, markets of two
countries or companies may be 
combined to maximum advantage, eg.
the foreign partner supplies the capital,
the developing country partner supplies
skilled fishermen as well as the resource.
Joint ventures should enable the transfer
of fishing and processing technology to
developing countries, generate 
employment in APC countries and
encourage the export of semi-processed
products rather than raw fish.
In practice, however, there are many
drawbacks. Apart from the commercial
risk, there are, in particular, risks of
financial manipulation by the dominant
partner. These are especially significant
to developing countries which can least
afford losses and have less 
sophistication in preventing them.
In some cases, foreign partners 
suspect that the conditions imposed by
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the coastal state would eliminate the
profitability of joint ventures. This is
because they fear that the coastal state
would require that catches landed for
delivery to local markets or for export
would be subject to prices fixed by 
government, artificial exchange rates and
restrictions on the repatriation of profits.
Conclusions
The redistribution of resources brought
about by the emergence of EEZ’s has
allowed coastal ACP states an 
opportunity to benefit from their offshore
resources. Lacking the harvesting
capacity to exploit all the resources
themselves, fisheries agreements with
other countries, including the EC, have
provided a short term solution to this 
situation. Under agreements with the
EC, financial compensation and 
contributions are paid to the coastal
state to allow Member State fishing 
vessels access to their waters. At
national level, these agreements may be
mutually beneficial. For ACP states, the
agreements supplement often chronic
shortages of foreign exchange in the
national economy and enable some
transfer of technology. For the EC, the
agreements have secured access to
waters for their distant water fleets, and
helped to delay their response to longer
term structural problems in the fishing
industries of certain Member States.
The agreements themselves,
have always been regarded as
commercial agreements,
equated similar status to export 
earnings, and not necessarily
intended as a tool for fisheries
development. On the other
hand, development policy 
objectives specified for fisheries,
under the Lome Conventions,
require that fisheries agreement
objectives should not conflict
with those under Lome.
Currently, conflict is kept to a minimum
because major issues where conflicts
could arise are not considered, the most
important of which is the effect of these
agreements, on artisanal fisheries. Also,
the lack of surveillance and enforcement
mechanisms in ACP states has made it
difficult to monitor any infringements in
the provisions.
This paper has endeavoured to 
emphasize that the effects of these
agreements on the artisanal fisheries of
ACP states is part of the broader issue
concerning the effects of industrial fleets,
foreign or national, on the long term 
sustainability of the artisanal fishery in
ACP States. It has identified likely problem
areas, where the artisanal fishery may be
effected by the activities of an industrial
fisheries sector. Some of these effects are
beneficial, and some, detrimental.
The development of the fishery sector in
any country involves the interaction of
many groups, some of whom have 
conflicting interests. This paper has also
tried to highlight the importance of these
groups and their relative power, which
helps to determine national fisheries
policy, EC-ACP policies towards 
fisheries agreements and Lome 
provisions on fisheries. One of these
groups, third country non-ACP states lie
totally outside the framework of ACP-EC
cooperation, but are nevertheless an
important group in terms of their effect on
the fishery. This would include other 
foreign vessels from, for example, Korea,
Japan, China and the Soviet Union.
The artisanal fishery sector,
another of these interest groups,
is often poorly organized and
generally under-represented at
the local, national and interna-
tional level. This means that their
interests are not given as much
importance as other groups and
their development potential is
therefore often underesti-
SAMUDRA DOSSIER Nr 4
35
mated. This has been compound-
ed by ACP fisheries policy tend-
ing to favour the development of
the industrial sector.
Current EC-ACP policy suggests that
artisanal fishery interests are 
subjugated by industrial fishery 
interests, and resource management by
financial benefits. However, the long
term sustainability of fisheries in ACP
states relies on effective and rational
fisheries management combined with
respect for both the industrial and 
artisanal fisheries. EC fisheries 
agreements and the Lome Convention
both have a role in promoting this policy.
At present, neither the current Lome
Convention, nor the current EC fisheries
agreements, give much weight to the 
interdependence of the industrial and 
artisanal fisheries sector or rational 
fisheries management, nationally or region-
ally. If these fisheries are to be managed
effectively, the interests of both sectors, as
well as ACP state and the EC must be well
represented at all fora. The most effective
way to ensure this is through the provisions
of the Lome Convention. But this is not done.
Recommendations
Based on these conclusions the 
following recommendations are made :
1 – As a matter of urgency, initiate 
evaluation of EC fleet activities on all
sectors of the fishery in ACP states and
encourage the development of an 
on-going monitoring and evaluation system ;
2 – Develop a community instrument
through Lome which lays down the
principles of EC-ACP fisheries agree-
ments to ensure that future fisheries
agreements incorporate provisions
safeguarding the interests of artisanal
fisheries. This can be achieved in a
number ways : EC contributions to fisheries
research that benefit both the artisanal and
industrial sector ; more srtingent regulations
regarding fishing areas and their violation ;
stricter regulations on the catching and
landing of by-catch ; educational grants for
institutions that specialize in small-scale
fisheries management ; licenses issued
subject to results of on-going evaluations.
Efforts should also be made to measure the
mutual exclusiveness or complementarity
of each goal when combined or pursued in
different ways and to order them 
preferentially in terms of their likely political,
social, economic, ecological and biological
costs and benefits ;
3 – Provide assistance to artisanal 
fishworkers, through Lome IV, on
the feasibility of setting up and 
operating artisanal fishworker 
organizations in ACP states, on a
national and/or regional basis ;
4 – Encourage the development of 
fishworker organizations, at all 
levels and in all sectors, to increase
awareness about the interaction between
all sectors of the fishery, the impacts of
their economic activities on fish stocks
and the coastal zone environment ;
5 – Acknowledge the valuable input that
could be made by 
Non-Governmental Organizations involved
in fisheries in the formation and 
implementation of national, regional and
international fisheries development policies ;
6 – Encourage a regional approach to
fisheries management, and where
appropriate, a regional approach to 
surveillance and enforcement similar to
those adopted by the Forum Fisheries
Agency in the Pacific ;
7 – Improve dialogue between EC
fleets, other foreign fleets and the
different fishery sectors in the ACP
states.
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Term
Initial period of three years from date of
entry into force. Remain in force for further
periods of two years unless terminated by
either party at least six months before the
date of expiry.
Terms of Licenses
Vessels must be inspected at Nouadhibou.
Each license owned by one vessel. Can be
replaced by another vessel in cases of
force majeure. Valid for one year.
Pole and Line Tuna Vessels
 41 vessels
 Fees
Lump sum advance of 2000 ECU/
Vessel/p.a.
20 ECU/tonne caught
Surface Longliners
 4 vessels
 Fees
Lump sum advance of 2000 ECU/
Vessel/p.a.
20 ECU/tonne caught
Lobster Boats (using pots)
 3 500 GRT/month ; annual average
 Fees
121 ECU/GRT/p.a.
Black Hake Trawlers
 15 000 GRT/month annual average
 Fees
71 ECU/GRT/p.a.
Shrimp Boats
 10 000 GRT/month annual average
 Fees
138 ECU/GRT/p.a
Pelagic Seiners
 2000 GRT/month annual average
 Fees
20 ECU/GRT/p.a.
Non-industrial Pelagic Seiners
 3 500 GRT/month annual average
 Fees
55 ECU/GRT/p.a.
Statement of Catch
Drawn up each month and presented at
least once every 6 months.
By-Catch
Vessels fishing shrimp, black hake and
coastal pelagic species may not hold on
board by-catch amounting to more than
10% of the total weight of the catch.
Fishing Zones
Fishing permitted :
Lobster boats :
3 nautical miles from base lines north of
Cap Timiris
6 nautical miles from base lines south
of Cap Timiris
Shrimp boats : 6 nautical miles from base-
lines
Black hake trawlers : 12 nautical miles from
baselines
DOCUMENT
Main Provisions of Agreement between Mauritania and The EEC
14 December 1987
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All pelagic seiners : 6 nautical miles from
baselines
Pole and line vessels and longliners : 3
nautical miles from baselines
Pole and line vessels fishing with live bait :
3 nautical miles from baselines up to 12
nautical miles, south of Cap Timiris
Except vessels of less than 150 GRT, all
vessels entering or leaving the fishing
zone shall radio the date, time and
position.
Signing on of Seamen
Owners of all vessels shall employ nation-
als to make up 35% of the non-officer crew
at rates of pay applicable to seamen on
Mauritanian vessels.
For duration of this Protocol, can not take
lower than 25% and shipowners are
required to pay compensation to authorities
of 2000 ECU/month for each seaman of
the number constituting the difference
between 35% and those actually
employed. Compensation shall be used to
train fishermen.
At the request of the authorities take on
board a fishermen/scientific observer as
part of the compulsory percentage taken
on board.
Employment contracts should cover social
security arrangements.
Inspection and Monitoring
Shall allow on board any Mauritanian offi-
cials responsible for inspection and moni-
toring and assist the officials in the accom-
plishment of their duties.
Mesh Sizes
 40 mm for use on shrimp boats
 60 mm for use on vessels fishing black
hake
 20 mm for use on all pelagic seiners
 8 mm for use on pole and line vessels
fishing with live bait
EEC Obligations
Financial Compensation
 20 250 000 ECU payable in 3 annual
installments
Contribution
 up to 600 000 ECU towards financing of
Mauritanian scientific and technical 
programmes in order to improve 
information on the fishery resources
within the fishing zone.
 facilitate the reception of Mauritanian
nationals in obtaining places for study
and training in Member or other states
linked to the Community by providing 6
five-year study and training awards
equivalent to total 30 academic years in
fisheries related subjects.
 two of these grants for an amount not
exceeding 90 000 ECU can be used to
finance the cost of participation at 
international meetings on fisheries.
Summarized by Sevaly Sen
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Source: socio-econmic Data Base on African Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Circular nº 810,1988
Appendix 1
DATA ON FISHERIES IN AFRICAN ACP STATES
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Coast
Length
(km)
Shelf
Area
(sq.km.)
EEZ
Area
(sq.km.)
Marine
Potential
(m.t.)
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
Artisanal TOTAL
Industrial
Fish as a
% of animal
protein intake
Fish as a
% of Agricult.
GDP
Agreements conclued :
Angola 1.650 51.000 330.000 655.000 11.735 61.604 73.339 43,7 4,0
Cap Verde 965 10.150 734265 25.000 6.216 2.184 8.400 43,7 15,0
Comoros 340 900 160.000 23.000 5.250 0 5.250 44,4
Equatorial Guinea 410 14.719 82.600 19.000 3.950 0 3.950 n.a.
Gambia 70 3.900 5.700 75.000 9.458 2.218 11.676 40,0 7,0
Guinea 350 50.180 50.000 270.000 24.920 3.080 28.000 33,0 1,0
Guinea Bissau 274 45.000 43.900 280.000 1.919 1.701 3.620 12,5
Madagascar 4.820 177.000 376.800 120.000 9.322 8.267 17.589 15,4 2,0
Mauritania 720 34.000 195.000 550.000 13.062 80.238 93.300 12,1 11,3
Mauritius 170 1.630 345.000 15.000 6.463 11.489 17.952 25,0 3,8
Mozambique 2.500 70.000 163.900 175.000 19.719 14.876 34.595 20,0 3,2
Sao Tome & Principe 261 1.459 160.000 17.000 1.000 1.500 2.500 66,7 23,0
Senegal 718 23.770 60.000 310.000 164.720 119.280 284.000 37,5 11,0
Seychelles 600 48.334 700.000 95.000 2.558 395 2.953 51,7
Agreements not conclued :
Gabon 885 35.400 150.000 130.000 11.078 8.022 19.100 32,1 20,0
Kenya 536 23.700 63.600 15.000 5.638 1237 6.875 8,3 20,0
Somalia 3.025 39.000 228.300 180.000 5.610 11.390 17.000 5,0 0,6
Tanzania 1.474 30.000 65.100 70.000 40.609 7.166 47.775 33,0 5,0
Ghana 536 23.700 63.600 300.000 218.429 112.524 330.953 50,0 7,0
Cote d’Ivoire 510 13.400 30.500 40.000 25.106 48.736 73.842 30,8 2,0
Liberia 537 18.400 67.000 60.000 12.079 2.652 14.731 40,0 12,0
Nigeria 850 37.394 61.500 170.000 122.434 23.321 145.755 33,3
Sierra Leone 402 24.800 45.400 130.000 25.160 11.840 37.000 66.7 23.0
Source: socio-econmic Data Base on African Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Circular nº 810,1988
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FULL TIME EMPLOYMENT
Industrial Artisanal Total
NON DECKED VESSELS
Number %
motorised
Ref.
Year Trawlers
DECKED VESSELS
Purse Multi-
Seiners Purpose
Other
TOTAL
DECKED
VESSELS
Ref.
Year
Agreements conclued :
Angola 500 16.500 17.000 1.200 436 1986
Cap Verde 300 2.600 2.900 1.173 32 1985 30 8 38 1936
Comoros 4.000 4.000 3.650 1986 1986
Equatorial Guinea 2.070 2.070 1.100 80 1986 3 3 1984
Gambia 150 1.800 1.950 780 90 1983 4 1 5 1985
Guinea 500 5.000 5.500 2.848 26 1985
Guinea Bissau 450 3.000 3.450 850 40 1985 4 2 6 1986
Madagascar 500 5.500 6.000 5.400 1986 40 9 49 1988
Mauritania 1.000 1.500 2.500 400 90 1986 130 130 1987
Mauritius n.a. n.a . 800 25 2 16 18 1986
Mozambique 2.500 7.500 10.000 5.200 1987 60 60 1980
Sao Tome & Principe n.a. n.a. 2.130 1.800 40 1986 1 7 8 1986
Senegal 3.600 30.400 34.000 8.300 66 1986 153 9 2 169 1986
Seychelles 30 690 770 490 77 1985 1 1 1986
Agreements not conclued :
Gabon 300 5.600 5.900 1.150 80 1987 9 18 11 38 1987
Kenya 650 3.500 4.150 1.830 15 1985 17 1 3 21 1986
Somalia 200 3.300 3.500 1.420 25 1986 14 14 1986
Tanzania 450 17.750 18.200 8.000 5 1988 24 6 3 33 1988
Ghana n.a. n.a. 90.000 8.288 52 1987 55 7 287 33 332 1986
Cote d’Ivoire 1.000 13.000 14.000 500 1986 25 20 45 1986
Liberia 200 4.200 4.400 1.050 34 34 1986
Nigeria n.a. n.a. 10.000 27 1986 240 240 1987
Sierra Leone n.a. n.a 7.500 10 1986 24 7 31 1985
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Appendix 2
FISHERIES AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED
BETWEEN THE EC AND ACP STATES
Country Entry into Force Reference
ANGOLA 30 November 1987 OJL341/ 1/87
COMOROS 20 July 1988
DOMINICA May 1987
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 15 June 1984
4 November 1987
OJL188/ 1/84
OJ L 29/ 1/87
GAMBIA 6 July 1987 OJL146/ 2/87
GUINEA BISSAU 27 February 1980
28 April 1987
OJL 226/33/80
OJL 113/ 1/87
GUINEA 7 February 1983
2 February 1987
OJL 111/ 2/83
OJL 29/ 9/87
MADAGASCAR 8 January 1986
12 November 1987
OJL 73/25/86
OJL 342/31/87
MAURITANIA 14 December 1987 OJL 388/ 1/87
MAURITIUS 23 November 1988 initialled
MOZAMBIQUE 13 July 1987 OJL 201/ 1/87
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 1 February 1984 23
November 1987
OJL 54/ 1/87 OJL 337/ 1/87
SENEGAL 15 June 1979
21 January 1982
20 November 1985
9 October 1987
OJL 226/ 17/80
OJL 234/ 9/82
OJL 361 87 85
OJ L 57/ 1/87
SEYCHELLES 23 May 1985
28 October 1987
OJL 149/ 1/85
OJL 160/ 1/87
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Lome IV
CAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS
LEAVE ROOM FOR DEVELOPMENT
OF SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES ?
While interacting with various fishworkers organisations inAfrica, the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers
(ICSF) learned that in many instances the fishery Agreements
signed under LOME III had very negative impacts on the fishworkers
communities. In 1989-90 a Campaign was launched at 3 levels :
1. Eyewitness accounts were collected from Africa about the 
situation of the fishworkers in this region : foreign investments,
conflicts between artisanal and industrial fisheries, evaluation of
marine resources, environmental problems, employment,
legislation, etc...
2. A meeting with representatives of fishworker’s organisations and
scientists from North and South was organised at Lisbon (Portugal)
in June 1989 aiming at mobilising fishworkers of the North around
issues of marine environment, resource management and the 
problems arising from the Common Fishery Policy known as ”Blue
Europe”. The recommendations made during the Symposium will
throw some more light on these problems (see page 51).
3. The European NGOs were alerted about these important issues
related to the development of artisanal fisheries in the South.
Following a Seminar organised by the European Environmental
Bureau (EEB) some propositions have been put forward to modify
the official text of the Lome Convention.
The Liaison Committee of Development NGOs of the European
Communities showed some concern for the fisworker’s problems and
published the article below in their Lome Briefing N° 8. Representatives
of the EEC and the ACP countries have taken notice of the text.
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Industrial and small-scale
fisheries : competition for
resources and other
contradictions
To some ACP states, coastal fisheries
are an important foreign exchange
earner because high-value species
such as shrimp, lobster and crab are to
be found in their territorial waters — i.e.
within the 200 mile exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) — often in the relatively
shallow waters of the continental shelf.
Moreover, in ACP countries, coastal
fisheries provide food and employment
for a large cross-section of the commu-
nity, as well as great potential for local
economic and technical development.
The capacity of fisheries to contribute
to both national income and food security
varies greatly among countries and
regions. In the Indian Ocean area, for
instance, Mozambique and Madagascar
derive substancial proportions of their 
foreign exchange from the export of fishery
products, but fish contributes little to food
security on a national basis. This is largely
because these countries, in their need to
earn hard currency, have concentrated
largely on setting up joint ventures with 
fishing concerns from industrialised 
countries, or have offered fishing licenses
to foreign fleets. Consequently, the
required investment effort has been 
channelled as a matter of course into
industrial fisheries even if, in the context of
economies burdened not only by debt but
also by widespread malnutrition, the 
development potential for the small-scale
fisheries sector is recognised in 
government plans. The attention paid to the
weaker sector is prompted by political as
well as humanitarian reasons in countries
where underemployment, land ownership
patterns, drought, desertification or war have
driven substantial numbers of people out of
inland areas and into the coastal zones.
Broad perspectives :
creating a space for
artisanal fisheries
The marine fisheries sector is based
on a fragile resource base ; if misman-
aged and over-exploited, it can easily
become a non-renewable resource. The
extent to which most fisheries in devel-
oping countries can continue to be
trawled is debatable, since it is widely
believed that most known fishing
grounds and species are near to or have
already reached their exploitable limit.
Trawlers and large traditional boats -
which are sometimes internationally
owned- compete with the local artisanal
sector for fish stocks. Well-equipped
trawlers can rapidly deplete a healthy 
offshore resource and then move to 
shallow waters in search of high-value
species. For example, off West Africa, it
is clear that some European fleets are
becoming less interested in deep sea
tuna, are able to adapt themselves to
new technology and move to new seas :
ruthless trawling of prawn beds on the
coast of Guinea Bissau is a case in point.
In many coastal fisheries, such as those
of West Africa, there is a role for both large
and small interests. However, the larger
(and more powerful) should not be allowed
to infringe on the activities of the smaller,
putting at risk the viability of the smaller
fishery and the coastal resource base in
order to satisfy short term financial goals,
which fishery agreements tent to favour.
Trawlers and other industrial vessels throw
overboard huge quantities of lower-value
fish on which local communities depend,
and also often destroy traditional fishing
gear, such as fixed nets, which get in their
way. Any coastal small-scale fisheries
development programme will only be as
successful as its ability to seek true
complementary and coordination with
industrial fishing interests even if this
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means that the interests of the large
boats will have to be curtailed.
Moreover, small-scale fisheries are
forced to compete with much larger
boats and more ”efficient” technology
not only for natural fishery resources,
but also for development funds and
access to marketing systems under
acceptable conditions for the producers.
This is despite the fact that artisanal
fisheries are the key to sustainable 
fisheries development and give a
greater return on investment. They
require less expensive inputs and have
the capacity to employ more people in
various capacities. Artisanal fisheries also
tend to use their catches and resources
available to them more rationally, thus
providing high quality food more econom-
ically and on a more sustained basis.
Since plans for food security and
financial stability compete for the same
resources — fish, money and labour -
they must be part of the same long term
strategy if the two objectives are to be
reconciled. In practice, this means that
the will to develop smallscale fisheries
needs to be strong enough on the part
of the government to allow this sector
the required conditions — in terms of
training, licenses, quotas, investment,
research, controls, etc. — to fish for
both export and for local markets.
Subsidies are certainly needed for
investment in those aspects of small-
scale fisheries which can hardly be
viable from a financial point of view
(such as local storage and marketing
infrastructures) because of the low pur-
chasing power of local people.
However, subsidies cannot provide a
strong economic and organisational
base: it is also necessary for the small-
scale fisheries sector to be in a position
to reinvest some of its earnings.
Traditional artisanal fisheries hold
great development potential because
they bring with them a rich resource
base of skill and knowledge and a 
stable social structure. Also, people with
no experience of fishing are increasing-
ly turning towards it for subsistance,
food and income. This is especially the
case where people are being displaced
for economic, political or environmental
reasons. These new fishing communi-
ties, which do not have a long tradition
of fishing behind them, are also in need
of appropriate development support.
But one should bear in mind that 
development does not rhyme with
assistance, nor with marginalisation.
Fisheries and food security
in a free-for-all trading
system
The significance of the contribution of
fish to food supplies in developing coun-
tries was noted by the FAO in its most
recent World Food Survey (1987). In
ACP countries, levels of fish consump-
tion differ widely between some small
island states and land-locked states,
where fish is marginal or non-existent in
an already protein deficient national diet.
Factors other than price and availabil-
ity can prevent fish products from getting
to where they would be most useful. A
lack of adequate transport, storage and
processing facilities forces fishworkers
to sell to coastal traders for export
abroad rather than to their neighbours
inland. This process not only deprives
local people of necessary food but the
very low prices paid for the exported
products undercut the indigenous fisher-
man of the region (the EEC, for exam-
ple) to which the fish has been exported.
As part of an overall strategy for
food security in developing countries,
no effort should be spared to ensure
that all the actors in the ’developing
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chain’ seek to increase the contribution
of fish to protein deficient diets and to
make it more broadly available to the
poor living in regions without ready
access to fish. In order to do this, we
must first examine the fisheries trade
worldwide. It is clear from published
FAO statistics that wealthy countries are
buying the fish (sometimes for 
manufacturing animal feed) which poor
countries need to eat, and that to make
up the difference, poor countries are
buying lower quality fish from wealthier
countries. Such anomalies need to be
well-analysed, documented and 
disseminated to engender the political
will and the means for exchange.
Lome III : Fisheries
agreements in competition
with fisheries development
in ACP countries
Lome III took great strides forward in
creating the basis for comprehensive
fisheries development which would not
only meet the needs of coastal and land-
locked ACP states but which also recog-
nised the role (and legitimacy) of fish-
eries agreements with Community fleets.
Fisheries agreements are the instru-
ments which allow EEC fleets to gain
licensed access to ACP waters. In
return, ACP states receive financial
compensation from the Community and
the ship owners, as well as concessions
covering employment and training of
ACP nationals, transfer of technology,
research, on-board observers and use
of by-catches.
The EEC is compelled to negotiate
fishery agreements with ACP states
because of the widely accepted 200
mile exclusive economic zone (EEZs),
the recent enlargement of the
Community fleet (which nearly doubled with
the entry of Spain and Portugal in 1986)
and its own nearly depleted fishery
grounds. To take the most obvious exam-
ple, employment in the Spanish fleet
would fall sharply without agreed rights to
fish in African seas. If the EEC recognis-
es the need to preserve employment in
Spanish fleets, measures could also be
adopted to ensure that communities in
ACP countries, which are economically
even more vulnerable, do not pay the
price of maintaining an European fleet.
Besides, the EEC Common Fisheries
Policy does not, in practice, give suffi-
cient recognition to the traditional role
played by artisanal fishing communities
in European coastal societies, although
the EEC has increasing power to pre-
vent the shores of Europe from being
given up to excessive industrial or
touristic development, with resulting
high levels of pollution. Better manage-
ment of the marine environment and
natural stocks in European waters
would lessen the need for European
fishermen to fish in Third World waters.
Although there has been little system-
atic evaluation, reports indicate that the
EEC/ACP fisheries agreements have not
been particulary successful beyond sat-
isfying the strictly commercial needs of
the ship owners. Little training has been
carried out and not much fish has been
landed for local consumption because it
is not in the commercial interests of the
ship owner to do so. Moreover, ACP sig-
natories of the fishery agreements do not
have the means to control encroach-
ments by industrial fleets in the inshore
areas which are sometimes theoretically
reserved for traditional fisheries.
In some instances — as is the case
of some Spanish and Portuguese
freezer-ships fishing off Mozambique
— whenever shrimp catches are not
landed locally, they are not counted
for. Since the catches are marketed
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outside its control, there is loss of
income for the ACP country in whose
waters the catches are made, as well as
unrecorded depletion of stocks. ACP
countries would therefore be justified in
insisting that one of there officials
should be present on board larger ves-
sels fishing within the framework of fish-
ery agreements with the EEC (as
Canada has done in its recent agree-
ment with France) and that fish caught
by European vessels in the EEZ of an
ACP country be considered as originat-
ing in that country (which the EEC
refuses in the current negotiations).
As for research, programmes arising
from agreements appear to have con-
cerned mainly high-value migratory
species such as tuna, destined for export,
rather than local species which can best
be exploited by small-scale fishermen for
local markets. This is unacceptable when
one considers the worsening food supply
for the poorest in many ACP countries
and the significant contribution to domes-
tic and regional food supply which is
made by small-scale fisheries.
A report to the European Parliament
regarding an agreement with Madagascar
declared that EEC/ACP fisheries 
agreements should be included in a food 
strategy backed by the EEC. Within such
a strategy, there is evidence to show that
strong local fishworkers’ organisations
can mobilise to keep fish marketing 
circuits short in order to keep prices
down, and too ensure that trading 
concerns do not favour export to strongly.
Recognising existing EEC develop-
ment programmes, fisheries agree-
ments could be linked directly to a pro-
gramme of support for appropriately
improved processing, storage and mar-
keting techniques and organisation,
building on already established local
networks. In artisanal fishing communi-
ties, these networks usual ly have
a strong basis in traditional social struc-
tures in which women play a central
economic role. ILL-considered disrup-
tion of these networks can have a neg-
ative impact on household income and
consequently on the well-being of other
members of the family. For women,
‘development’ has often meant an
increased work load and lower income.
Artisanal fisheries projects in particular
have tended towards improving the effi-
ciency of fishermen rather than looking
at the needs of all the participants in the
local industry. New programmes should
ensure that women’s income and skill
levels are not lowered by technological
changes.
Recommendations
The ICSF would like to make the fol-
lowing recommendations to the EEC
and ACP officials involved in the Lome
negotiations :
1. A partial redirection of the funds
paid by the EEC in exchange for
capture of tuna and other species by
European fleets towards development
programmes for small-scale fishing com-
munities would greatly enhance their
capabilities. Not only fishing should ben-
efit these programmes but also all the
associated local industries on which so
many people depend for food and
income. The Lome Convention should
aim to provide an impetus to demargin-
alise the small-scale sector in ACP coun-
tries, by helping to make it viable. The
EEC should examine ways of encourag-
ing investment in small-scale fisheries,
without reducing the foreign exchange
earned by the ACP states from activity in
the fisheries sector as a whole.
2. In recognising the development
role of organisations of fish-
workers and fishing communities, the
EEC should support the design of 
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fisheries development projects by fish-
workers organisations, especially in the
areas of support for basic education
and local training programmes and for
appropriate credit systems which
encourage the autonomy of fishworkers’
organisations. Grass roots participation
should be both in micro-projects, which
come within the scope of the Lome III
Convention, and in development pro-
grammes initiated by the ACP govern-
ment and administrated by DG VIII.
3. In fishery agreements, inshore
zones for the exclusive benefit of
local small-scale fisheries could be
agreed upon, in conjunction with a pro-
gramme for protection of resources with-
in the fragile and increasingly threatened
marine environment and for research on
inshore resources and socio-economic
needs of fishing communities.
4. The Commission itself could hold
joint evaluations by DG VIII
(Cooperation and Development) and
DG XIV (Fisheries) on the impact of
fishery agreements on small-scale fish-
eries in ACP countries. Such evaluation
should help the EEC and ACP countries
to alleviate competition for resources
and to identify other possible contradic-
tions in their policy for cooperation in
the fishery sector.
5. The Commission could also exam-
ine the ways in which fish could be
used in triangular food aid to stimulate
local markets and South-South trade
(with appropriate investment in trans-
port and communication means to open
up fish marketing networks in inland
areas).
6. Exchanges should take place
between ACP countries on other
levels, for instance, those involving
market information and scientific and
technical research, with a view to pro-
moting regional cooperation in fish-
eries. But fishworkers’ organisations
and research institutes in EEC coun-
tries should also be encouraged to
share their experience in the field of
social security cover, management, fish
marketing and resource management
with fishworkers’ organisations in ACP
countries. Private joint ventures may be
a means of enacting professional coop-
eration of this kind.
Demand for coordinated
policies
A new Lome Convention must provide
the means (both political and 
budgetary) by which the EEC and ACP
states can seek complementarity to
ensure that fisheries agreements signed
within the terms of the Lome Convention
effectively serve the dual objective of
gaining fair access for European fleets
to new grounds while supporting
autonomous rural development for food
security in ACP states.
However, within the Commission
there is an administrative disjunction
between these two objectives, as they
are pursued by separate Directorates
General (VIII and XIV). The negotiations
for ‘Lome IV’ should address this prob-
lem and ways should be sought to coor-
dinate and harmonise the policies which
govern fisheries agreements and fish-
eries development as a whole.
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The basic right of fishworkers to
form their own professional organ-
isation must be the cornerstone of
small-scale fisheries development.
Governments and international bodies
must recognise fishworker’s organiza-
tions and respect their autonomy.
The quality of the environment is a
major condition for ensuring that
employment, food and revenue are
available for coastal populations.
Protection of the sea and the coast is a
priority.
Fishworker’s organizations and govern-
ments should participate jointly in the for-
mulation of coastal planning and protec-
tion of aquatic resources.
Resource management must be
carried out jointly by fishworker’s
organizations and governments.
The resource must remain a collective
property.
Resource management methods should
be an integral part of an overall fisheries
policy that takes into account social, eco-
nomic and ecological objectives.
The roles of women in the fisheries
sector are recognised and must be
supported.
Their capacity to ensure the defence and
promotion of their economic, social and
cultural interests must be strengthened.
Special attention should be paid to the liv-
ing conditions of fishworker’s children.
Scientific research must develop a
capacity to take fishworker’s
knowledge in consideration, and
respect their culture.
Scientists who recognise the importance
of the environment should commit them-
selves to support fishworker’s organiza-
tions in order to help them defend their
rights of access to aquatic resources.
Access of foreign fishing vessels
to the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) must in every case be
approved and controlled by local
fishworker’s organizations.
A coastal zone must be reserved for
small-scale fishing.
Foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ must
be equipped with satellite detection
devices so that their activity can be con-
trolled.
The extension of this method of control to
the national and international levels
should be discussed within the framework
of the United Nations.
International fishmarketing should
be reoriented in such a way to give
precedence to the interests of fish-
workers and of Third World popula-
tions.
Part of the revenue accruing from fishery
agreements should be used for the
organization of local and regional mar-
kets.
Blue Europe must be first and fore-
most a Europe of fishworkers.
Joint evaluations of the impacts of the
Blue Europe policies and fishery agree-
ments with the ACP (Africa, Caribbean
and Pacific) states must be carried out by
the European Commission, ACP states
and by fishworker’s organizations in the
ACP states. The same recommendations
apply to the North Atlantic region.
A policy of cooperation has to be
implemented in negotiation with
fishworker’s organizations from
the North and the South in
response to an interdependent
world.
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DOCUMENT
LISBON CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS
THE INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVE 
IN SUPPORT OF FISHWORKERS
The International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) is an international
network founded in India in 1986, with the objective of providing fishworkers (men,
women and children) with a platform to make their voice heard at the international
level so that the numerous problems they face both at land and at sea may be taken
into consideration by their governments and international organisations.
In its search for cooperation and solidarity, the Collective joins hands with fish-
workers’ organisations and unions. Its characteristic feature lays in its close coop-
eration between scientists and social workers on the one hand and fishworkers,
both from Southern as well as from Northern countries, on the other.
The goals of the Collective can be considered as providing the basis of four long
term programs :
MONITORING AND RESEARCH PROGRAMS
This program will provide the basis for various development studies in close colla-
boration with scientists and workers of the fishing profession.
TRAINING AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
This program will undertake the essential task of exchanging experiences and
culminated knowledge. This will include the sharing of findings on new and appro-
priate technologies, learning from new organisational structures and interaction
between the scientific community and workers, with the objective of demarginalis-
ing artisanal fisheries. The interaction is twofold : on the one hand the exchange
between fishworkers and scientists and on the other hand the communication
between fishworkers of various countries.
ACTIONS AND CAMPAIGNS
ICSF decided to support, at their request, fishworkers organisations facing
troubles.
COMMUNICATION
The Collective has devised various means of communication : SAMUDRA Re-
port, SAMUDRA Dossier, SAMUDRA Monograph (*) ; a collection of video tapes,
etc...
The ICSF is coordinated by a seven member voluntary animation team. They are
the officiai "contact persons" and reside in Bangkok (Thailand), Bogota (Colombia),
Brussels (Belgium), Dakar (Senegal), Manila (Philippines), Trivandrum (India),
Valparaiso (Chile).
Founded in the Third World the Collective endeavours, although with limited
means, to view the problems faced by the small-scale fishehes sector in a global
context.
(*) The word "Samudra" signifies "ocean" in many Asian languages and thus evokes the vastness of the
problems that face the fishworkers.
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THE FISHERY ACCORDS 
WITHIN THE LOME CONVENTION
Although it only involves a limited number of Third
World countries, the Lome Convention reflects the philoso-
phy and current state of the relationship between the Euro-
pean Community and its former colonies from the South.
The Convention was originally designed and drawn up
with a view to encouraging the development of the coun-
tries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific – the so-cal-
led ACP states – , but it appears that subsequent events,
especially of recent date, pose a threat to the spirit of 
Lome.
The fishery Accords which have corne within the scope
of this Convention since the first of them was signed in 
1983 coincide with the recognition of the new Law of the 
Sea and so far involve twenty or so ACP states. In a similar
fashion to the farming Accords, the fishery Accords have 
not reached their objectives as development aid and remain
primarily agreements of a commercial nature aimed at sa-
tisfying the needs of a market economy.
The introduction of new provisions aimed at bringing the
Convention into alignment with the IMF's structural ad-
justment programmes and the disturbfng limitation in the
number of fishery accords lead us to conclude that we are
presently witnessing a change in the direction of the Euro-
pean Community's policy towards its partners from the
South. But is this policy geared towards encouraging the
poorest among them ?
SAMUDRA Dossier n° 4
